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LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN PATTERN OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

ABSTRACT

Liberalism and republicanism constitute two major concepts of civic participation, both in the historical and the socio-philosophical meaning. The first one is questioned because of its individualistic vision of citizenship leading to impairment of community ideas and values, responsibility and motivation to engage in actions promoting the common good and decay of social bonds. The republican pattern of civic participation is a correction of this concept, putting emphasis on the value and meaning of communal forms of social life as well as on civil education. The article characterizes and compares both patterns of civic involvement in socio-political life, emphasizing differences and simplifications occurring between particular orientations of both republican and liberal concepts. Moreover, the article aims at interpreting main ideas constituting the republican idea, such as: freedom, equality, community, common good and solidarity.

Keywords:

civic participation, freedom, equality, community, common good, solidarity.

The idea of civic participation¹ is currently subject of discussion, dispute and research. Such controversy results from a crisis of democracy and legitimation of power, shortfall of civic engagement and growing mistrust towards liberal and neoliberal ideas².

¹ The concept of civic participation has various definitions. Literature proposes such notions as: public participation, social participation or civic participation. Those terms usually differ in the accent put on areas or ways of participation in socio-political life as well as in the character of the relationship between individuals, nation and power. See: A. Wilkomirska, *Wiedzieć i rozumieć aby być obywatelem. Studium empiryczne*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2013, p. 39.

² Eugenia Potulicka is a highly strict critic of translating neoliberal ideas, especially on the Polish system of education. She denounces such social consequences of neoliberalism as: commercialization of education and upbringing, lowering of level of communization and decay of social solidarity. See: E. Potulicka, *Pytania o skutki neoliberalizmu. Aspekt społeczny*, [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Kraków 2010, pp. 326–334.

Liberals are convinced of a superior value of individual over any community, state or other instance beyond individual and believe in the rule of priority of individual's laws and freedom over the common good. From such a point of view, liberalism aims for individual's rights, not obligations of citizens towards their state. The citizen can follow his own interests, personal goals and moral autonomy³ both in private and public life. As emphasized by Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, liberalism sees citizenship as *universal as common human strive for freedom and liberation from constraints imposed by various systems*⁴. This approach ensures a variety of actions to each individual according to their will, but does not guarantee stability of democratic socio-political system.

The republican idea of civic participation is a proposal of motivation and activation of citizens into socio-political area. According to republican supporters, republican concepts come alive especially during periods of dissatisfaction, although they can only constitute a correction of liberalism and its illusions, especially of the fact that *it is possible to only administer without doing politics*⁵, as underlined by Marcin Król.

Republicanism⁶ is closely linked to a strong idea of politicalness assuming an active participation of citizens into political life, resulting from responsibility of government relying on an active and mindful civic behavior⁷. Politics are not constricted to playing the role of intermediary between citizen and state, as it is the case of liberalism, but, according

³ See: J. Charuta-Kojkoł, *Liberal model of democracy and citizenship*, 'Colloquium', 2015, No. 1, p. 106.

⁴ E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2005, p. 109.

⁵ M. Król, *Republikańska korekta*, [in:] *Idee republikańskie. Trzy idee*, Wydawnictwo Respublica Nowa, Warszawa 2011, ed. R. Clewis, Ch. Delsol, M. Król, P. Pettit, A. Waśkiewicz, R. Wolin, p. 14.

⁶ Terms: republicans, republicanism and republic derives from Latin *res publica*, which may be translated as public matter, common matter, popular matter. Since the time of republican Rome until the 18th century, it was an area of public matters, connecting people outside of their family life. Contemporarily, this term can be translated as state in which the governing socio-political system guarantees participation in power to all citizens, although it is an anachronism. See: T. Buksiński, *Współczesne filozofie polityki*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznań 2006, p. 97, K. Haakonsen, *Republikanizm*, [in:] *Przewodnik po współczesnej filozofii politycznej*, ed. R. E. Goodina, P. Pettita, Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa 1998, p. 724.

⁷ See: M. Król, *Filozofia polityczna*, Wydawnictwo Zak, Kraków 2008, p. 145.

to Jürgen Habermas, *it represents a measure of society constitution as a politically organized entity*⁸.

Republicans emphasize values and meaning of common forms of social life, accentuating civic virtues and the need of their shaping through education and upbringing. Citizens are seen through the prism of community and their primary concern should be the common good. In E. Wnuk-Lipiński's view, the human is a citizen *if he is rooted in a community and when his relations with this community shape his feeling of nationality, civil behavior and care of the common good*⁹.

In order to better understand both contradicting concepts of civic participation, it is vital to look back on historically shaped ideas of liberalism and republicanism. A comparison of dominating characteristics will not only facilitate the comprehension of those ideas, but also verify the thesis that the republican pattern of civic participation is a correction of the liberal vision of freedom, equality, civic society and state, as well as of civic education.

Individual freedom aiming at organizing public life is the essential feature of liberalism. Benjamin Constant took a classical and fundamental stand on this matter as he wrote that *we cannot enjoy the freedom of the ancient people, the freedom consisting of an active and constant participation in collective power. Our freedom means quiet indulgence in personal independence. The purpose of the contemporary people is to profit from benefits which bring individual independence, whether their freedom is made from guarantees made by institutions*¹⁰.

It was John Stuart Mill who underlined the autonomy of the individual in the state and the boundaries of its freedom, intransgressible by national institutions¹¹. His view of freedom encompassed: first of all, an inner sphere of conscience — *requirement of a free conscience in its totality; freedom of thought and emotion, absolute freedom of opinion and judgment in all practical, philosophical, academic, moral or theological matters*. Second of all, freedom of preferences and occupation — *making one's own life plan according to their character, acting according to one's will provided that*

⁸ J. Habermas, *Uwzględniając Innego*, trans. A. Romaniuk, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 245.

⁹ E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, op. cit., p. 109.

¹⁰ B. H. Constant, *O wolności starożytnych i nowożytnych*, trans. Z. Kosno, [in:] *Historia idei politycznych. Wybór tekstów*, ed. S. Filipowicz, A. Mielczarek, K. Pielniński, M. Tański, tom II, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2002, p. 249.

¹¹ See: K. Trzeciński, *Obywatelstwo w Europie*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2006, p. 176.

*one suffers possible consequences, without impediment of other people if one's actions are harmless to others, even if they considered those actions foolish, deceitful or improper. Third of all, freedom to organize – unite in all kinds of purposes but ones that could harm other people*¹².

The extent of civic freedom presented by J. S. Mill entered into the canon of liberal postulates and made its foundation. Nevertheless, the ideas of this most prominent classic of liberalism are treated selectively. J. S. Mill saw freedom as a condition of individual development, or, as pointed out by M. Król, as human aspiration towards greater pleasure and education. The consequence of such action is *a clear division into elites making use of freedom and the rest, which, even in the most civilised societies, does not take such effort, only leaning on lower pleasure*¹³. In other words, J. S. Mill understood freedom as freedom of the privileged. It may also be suspected that J. S. Mill was truly interested in the private freedom instead of the political society freedom.

The clearest concept of individual freedom was elaborated by Isaiah Berlin who formulated the term of negative freedom 'from' opposing positive freedom 'to'. In his opinion, the negative freedom is freedom 'from' intervention into human actions which should let him independently decide about his life. A man is free when no individual, group or state interfere with his actions. Such freedom represents the condition of breaking free of all kinds of constraints and ensures a minimum of private autonomy. In this context, negative freedom is understood as a minimal range of personal freedom, which means that *a boundary has to be drawn between the sphere of personal life and the domain of public power*¹⁴. Negative freedom seen in such light became the sign of liberal approach as it does not impose particular actions, especially in socio-political life¹⁵.

I. Berlin's opinion contradicts the republican vision of freedom which, as writes M. Król, *says that the only way to ensure personal freedom as well as individual realisation is to take part in political decisions made by the community. Freedom in political society requires constant participation in the*

¹² J. S. Mill, *Utylitaryzm*, trans. M. Ossowska, *O wolności*, trans. A. Kurlandzka, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1959, p. 133.

¹³ M. Król, *Filozofia polityczna*, op. cit., p. 77.

¹⁴ I. Berlin, *Cztery eseje o wolności*, trans. H. Bartoszewicz, D. Grinberg, D. Lachowska, A. Tanalska-Dulęba, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1994, p. 184.

¹⁵ I. Berlin's division into negative and positive freedom is subject of endless discussion, consideration and comment. One of these discussions is dominated by the belief that the negative freedom is a sign of liberal thought. See: R. Wonicki, *Spór o demokratyczne Państwo Prawa. Teoria Jurgena Habermasa wobec liberalnej, republikańskiej i socjalnej wizji państwa*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007, p. 53.

*effort to guarantee freedom*¹⁶. Republicans understand freedom in a positive meaning, seeing it as actual deciding and taking action in both private and political areas. This view is discrepant with I. Berlin's concept, as his idea of positive freedom 'to' — realization of a political idea, self-fulfillment or authenticity may lead to an individual identification with imposed ideas, as a consequence leading to paternalism, being for I. Berlin above all *an offence to the concept of a human being as such, who decided to leave according to his own goals (not necessarily rational or beneficent ones) and who, above all, has the right to be treated in the same way by others*¹⁷.

Republicans do not differentiate individual freedom from the political one, as they claim that the condition of the first will always be the latter. J. Habermas expresses a similar opinion, as he claims that citizens as private individuals have the right to enjoy individual freedom, but as citizens adopt political rights, which not only guarantee their participation in the community, but also let them build a community of free and equal people¹⁸.

The beginning of the idea of civic self-determination can be found in Aristotle's Greek polis, as he writes that absolutely *nothing can describe a citizen of ancient Athens more than the law to take part in court and government*¹⁹, which means the privilege of participating in public life. The possibility to co-decide about political or rather social matters of the community was even more than a privilege, it was a moral obligation and a virtue. Aristotle formed the classical concept of relationship between virtue and politics and he challenged polis citizens. In Aristotle's view, civic activity was an intrinsic value and the highest form of human life. He thought that the human being was a political animal — *zoon politikon* — who could completely fulfill his potential in public activity. The public domain was a place of realization of human goodness, or, what Aristotle called *eudaimonia*. Therefore, participation in politics is the ultimate purpose of human life.

Therefore, it may be established that the republican positive freedom is fulfilled in the state, not by the state, as it is the case in liberalism. Only collective activity following commonly agreed norms of conduct are accepted in republicanism. One might also agree with Tadeusz Buksiński's opinion according to whom republicans *take into consideration not only consistency of laws and political decisions with values of a particular*

¹⁶ M. Król, *Filozofia polityczna*, op. cit., p. 89.

¹⁷ I. Berlin, *Cztery eseje o wolności*, op. cit., p. 218.

¹⁸ See: J. Habermas, *Uwzględniając innego*, op. cit., p. 239.

¹⁹ Arystoteles, *Polityka*, trans. L. Piotrowicz, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2008, p. 77.

community but also, or perhaps even mostly, their conformity with general human norms and laws²⁰.

It may be deduced that freedom seen as antithesis of domination, aiming at securing the minority from the majority's domination, is part of positive freedom. Philip Pettit describes freedom as *negative in the sense that it requires the lack of others' domination, but not necessarily self-control of whatever it relates to. On the other hand, it is positive as at least it requires more than just lack of interference; it requires protection from interference, especially from arbitral interference*²¹.

The idea of liberal individual freedom is justified in the epistemological egalitarianism which claims that *every human being is potentially able to gain knowledge of social reality as well as about his being and personal needs and that he has the right to pursue realization of his interests while respecting the same right of other people*, as claims Adam Chmielewski²². However, as Paul Kelly rightfully observes, *contemporary liberalism considers and notices the need of fair distribution of property and access to resources as a challenge against rising material imbalance*²³. That is why epistemological egalitarianism has been superseded by political liberalism as described by John Rawls. In his view, liberal democracy is a theory of social justice. He claims that subjects establish two rules of justice in an unbiased way *under cover of ignorance*²⁴. The first rule claims that *every person has equal right to the most freedom capable to be reconciled with similar freedom of others*²⁵. It concerns freedom of conscience and thought, speech and assembly, right to own property, right to vote and hold public offices, right to stand for public offices, right to travel and protection against arbitrary arrest. The second rule claims that *social and economical imbalance should be disposed in such a way that (a) it can be assumed that it would suit everyone and (b) that they would entail*

²⁰ T. Buksiński, *Współczesne filozofie polityki*, op. cit., pp. 98–99.

²¹ P. Pettit, *Wolność jako nie – dominacja*, [in:] *Idee republikańskie. Trzy idee*, op. cit., p. 69.

²² A. Chmielewski, *Spoleczeństwo otwarte czy wspólnota? Filozoficzne i moralne podstawy nowoczesnego liberalizmu oraz jego krytyka we współczesnej filozofii społecznej*, Oficyna Wydawnicza ARBORETRUM, Wrocław 2001, p. 82.

²³ P. Kelly, *Liberalizm*, trans. S. Królak, Wydawnictwo Sic! s.c., Warszawa 2007, p. 99.

²⁴ J. Rawls, *Teoria sprawiedliwości*, Biblioteka Współczesnych Filozofów, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1994, p. 24.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

*positions and offices open for all equally*²⁶. This rule applies mainly to income and wealth distribution as well as organizational structure characterized by power and diversification of responsibility. J. Rawls underlines the fact that the first rule involving freedom and entitlements is more important than rules of social and economic justice determined by the second rule. Freedom and rights are indefeasible, therefore they need to be distributed equally, however inequalities and limitations in division of wealth and power are possible. According to Magdalena Żardecka-Nowak, the second rule *determines equitable conditions of diversification*²⁷.

On the other hand, republicans assume equal value of people as moral beings and public subjects. Such an understanding of equality is different from the liberal idea *in the way of being treated as equal to others in individual actions, in terms of deciding of one's own fate and common matters, not formally equal*, as claims T. Buksiński²⁸. In republicanism, individual equality towards the law, in J. Habermas' view, results *from an objective legal order, which simultaneously enables and guarantees integrity of equal and autonomic coexistence consisting of mutual respect*²⁹.

The connection of public sphere with the idea of government by law can be found in the Roman republican tradition, especially in Marcus Tullius Cicero's thought *that the state (res publica) is a matter of the people (res populi). The people are not any collectivity gathered in an arbitrary way, but a great group bound by obeying the same law and by the profit resulting from their coexistence*³⁰.

Republicans claim that common good can be obtained and adopted only through cooperation with other free and equal citizens. However, republicanism does not value the common good as highly before citizens of the state as does, for example, communitarianism. T. Buksiński underlines the fact *the republicans put emphasis on justice encompassing both human and civil rights (with particular religious and customary rights being discarded to the private sphere) as well as treating justice and state rights*

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 87.

²⁷ M. Żardecka-Nowak, *Rozum i obywatel. Idea rozumu publicznego oraz koncepcja jednostki we współczesnej filozofii polityki*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, Rzeszów 2007, p. 32.

²⁸ See: T. Buksiński, *Współczesne filozofie polityki*, op. cit., pp. 98–99.

²⁹ J. Habermas, *Uwzględniając innego*, op. cit., p. 240.

³⁰ M. T. Cynceron, *O państwie*, trans. W. Kornatowski, [in:] *Historia idei politycznych. Wybór tekstów*, tom I, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2002, p. 92.

as common good³¹. Also in Włodzimierz Kaczocha's opinion, republicanism projects common good including: justice, social peace, democracy, positive freedom and human being with spiritual and physical development³².

That is why, in the republican concept, the civic society gains strategic importance as it's based on a community of free and equal citizens working together to realize the common good. Community is seen as a natural political group, not a national or ethnic one, therefore not only a group of people having the same nationality. Republicanism does not differentiate between state and society³³.

A liberal society, though, is seen as a collection of morally autonomic individuals equipped in their own ideas of a good life where the social function is narrowed down to ensuring individual equity towards the law³⁴. It may be deduced that this perception opposes civic society from the state.

Liberals are against giving the state too much power as it may lead to an excessive interference in the collective life. In their understanding, the role of the state is brought down to ensuring homeland and external security as well as protection and enhancement of civic rights and freedom. Moreover, the state should remain neutral in world-view, philosophical, ethnic and religious matters. The rule of neutrality is an essential condition of the citizen being able to shape his views and beliefs and making use of his freedom.

For the republicans, the state is a tool of protecting freedom as non-domination and commonly agreed public good. Aristotle brought this thought to life, as for him, the state was not *a group of people brought in a place for protection against mutual injustice and to enable exchange of goods. All of these are necessary for the state to exist but even though these conditions are met, it is not yet a state, as it needs to be a community of people leading a happy life, encompassing families and houses for perfect and self-sufficient existence*³⁵. Thus, the purpose of public activity is ruling and influencing the state and politics in a systematic and organized way, not only limited to choosing representation. One of the main purpose of the state is to execute

³¹ T. Buksiński, *Filozofia polityczna*, op. cit., p. 107.

³² See: W. Kaczocha, *Demokracja proceduralna oraz republikańska*, Poznań 2004, pp. 126–177.

³³ See: D. Pietrzyk-Reeves, *Idee społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Współczesna debata i jej źródła*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2004, p. 51.

³⁴ See: E. Wnuk-Lipiński, *Socjologia życia publicznego*, op. cit., p. 132.

³⁵ Arystoteles, *Polityka*, op. cit., p. 89.

the law and sustain civic virtues, which in turn are essential for maintaining the state and freedom it guarantees.

Aristotle formulated a classical concept of relationship between virtue and politics, as he claimed that the possibility to co-decide of matters of political community³⁶ was more than a privilege, it was a virtue. He posed high requirements on polis citizens. He not only required highly developed moral qualifications — civic virtues, but also social qualifications — descendance and intellect. Aristotle claimed that only free and equal people can take part in public life, as they can be expected to take full responsibility of their actions. The durability and future of the Greek polis depended on effective and consequent education system. Education according to Aristotle should take virtue into consideration and should prepare to both rule and being ruled as well as should be fulfilled by the state. He wrote: *the state which really deserves this name needs to care about virtue. Otherwise, the community becomes a group of allies which is differentiated from other groups of distant allies only by space, whereas the law becomes an agreement and warranty of mutual justice, without the possibility to form good and fair citizens*³⁷.

The theme of civic education is, according to Piotr Weryński, *another indicator of republican pattern of participation in public life. It is manifested through centuries of republican ideas evolution towards the contemporary requirements of independent thought imposed to all active subjects taking responsibility of the public life shape, idea developed, among others, by Hanna Arendt*³⁸.

In the republican concept, civic virtue consists of moral participation in public life and encompasses features such as: fondness of republican freedoms, understanding of one's place in the republic's life and meaning

³⁶ Aristotle defined the Greek polis as political community, although Enrico Berti claims that the term of political society should be used in modern language instead of political community. Community, according to Berti, is based on a common reality which does not depend on mind and will (as does community of blood, religion or language), whereas political community leans on a common goal to be gained by the power of mind and will. In the context of such difference it is clear that polis, different than any other form of bonds such as family or household, is not a community but a political society of some sort, as happiness of all its members is its goal. See: E. Berti, *Profil Arystotelesa*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznań 2016, p. 178.

³⁷ Arystoteles, *Polityka*, op. cit., p. 88.

³⁸ P. Weryński, *Wzory uczestnictwa obywatelskiego Polaków*, Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, Warszawa 2010, p. 18.

of one's actions towards preserving it, patriotism, courage, truthfulness, prudence, criticism, tolerance, compassion. Above all, the citizen has a feeling of solidarity with other citizens. Civic solidarity is the basis of conducting ethical and political discussion as well as self-organization of the society. W. Kaczocho writes that *accepting the value of solidarity and being aware of mutual influence of citizens, shaped within cultural tradition, including democracy building, make people inclined towards seeking common good*³⁹. In the republican spirit, solidarity is also, according to M. Żardecka-Nowak: *readiness to limit one's own desire and aspiration in the name of the community*⁴⁰.

Liberalism discards the thesis of intrinsic value of civic virtue. According to Andrzej Szutta, the liberal state cannot support civic virtues as necessary ingredients of a good life, as it would mean, in the light of plural concepts of such, choosing only one idea of good life at the expense of others, while assuming liberal rules of justice (equality and freedom), it would mean unfair treatment of those who did not adopt such a definition of good life⁴¹. Moreover, liberals claim that agreement in terms of intrinsic value of political life cannot be expected. That is why, even though civic virtues are essential in liberalism, they serve a purely instrumental role⁴².

Conclusions

In order to sum up the presented interpretation of chosen liberal and republican concepts, it is important to notice that freedom is seen in the first pattern as freedom from an external obligation. Liberals protect such an understanding of freedom to the point of absurdity, what is noticed by P. Kelly as he writes that *theories of negative freedom treat all forms of interference as limitation of freedom, even those which aim at protecting it*⁴³. In the positive notion, freedom is seen as an idea of action in both private and political life. Therefore, it is a necessary part of the democratic system, which leans on the idea of political community acting for the common good.

³⁹ See: W. Kaczocho, *Filozofia społeczna. Wybrane zagadnienia filozoficzno-teoretyczne oraz empiryczne*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2015, p. 124.

⁴⁰ M. Żardecka-Nowak, *Rozum i obywatel. Idea rozumu publicznego oraz koncepcja jednostki we współczesnej filozofii polityki*, op. cit., p. 201.

⁴¹ A. Szutta, *O cnotach obywatelskich na przykładzie koncepcji instrumentalnego republikanizmu Williama Kymlicki*, 'Diametros', 2012, No. 32, p. 213.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 213.

⁴³ P. Kelly, *Liberalizm*, trans. S. Królak, op. cit., pp. 81–82.

Liberalism assumes egalitarianism as fundamental equality of all individuals, which in turn does not mean inequalities resulting from uneven talents, health, strength, commitment and willingness for work, prudence or resourcefulness. In the republican term, freedom assumes equal value of individuals as moral beings and public subjects, which means that an individual is treated substantially, not formally.

According to liberals, civic society is a group of autonomic individuals with their own idea of good life. In the republican term however, civic society leans on a community of free and equal citizens realizing the common good. Such an attitude allows to see not only one's particular interest among collective actions, but also the value of the common good. It influences as well strengthening of social capital, social bonds and relations as well as building the third sector's potential.

In the liberal concept, the state serves the function of an instrument aiming at fulfilling the needs of individuals and social groups conscious of their interests. On the other hand, for the republicans, the state is an emanation of the common good and its politics must rely on the moral ground. That is why, the state is responsible for strengthening civic virtues which have to be conveyed through education. However, building a country on moral virtues of its citizens has not succeeded so far and still remains an unrealistic endeavour, as according to Immanuel Kant: the republican system is the only one fully corresponding to human rights, but its enactment and especially its protection are so difficult that some people claim that it would need to be a country of angels, as humans, with their egoistic inclinations, are not capable to function in such a subtle form of government⁴⁴. That doesn't mean that we should get discouraged and oppose disclosing and realizing civic virtues by individuals, especially in times when corruption is a common disease of political elites. It should also inspire all those who strive for public life renewal.

The discussed ideas of liberalism and republicanism constitute only a fragment of the civic participation concept of both patterns. It seems that they make both theories. Their juxtaposition and comparison enabled the conclusion that they derive from a common root of democratic ideas. They complement and rectify each other according to the stage of historic development of the society. It seems that republicanism is currently

⁴⁴ I. Kant, *O porzekadle: To może być słuszne w teorii, ale nic nie jest warte w praktyce. Do wiecznego pokoju*, critical development, introduction, notes, bibliography and index, H. F. Klemme, trans. M. Żelazny, Wydawnictwo COMER, Toruń 1995, p. 73.

a correction of liberalism adapted to progress trends suppressing the globalization process. It is visible especially in the ideas of freedom, equality, civic society, state and civic education.

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LIBERALNA I REPUBLIKAŃSKA KONCEPCJA PARTYCYPACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ

STRESZCZENIE

Liberalizm i republikanizm stanowią dwie główne, zarówno w sensie historycznym, jak i filozoficzno-społecznym, koncepcje partycypacji obywatelskiej. Pierwsza z nich jest kwestionowana ze względu na indywidualistyczny charakter obywatelstwa prowadzący do osłabienia idei i wartości wspólnotowych, odpowiedzialności za wspólnotę i motywację do angażowania się na rzecz dobra wspólnego oraz zaniku więzi społecznych. Korektę tej koncepcji stanowi republikański wzór partycypacji obywatelskiej kładący nacisk na wartości i znaczenie wspólnotowych form życia społecznego oraz edukację obywatelską. W artykule scharakteryzowano i porównano dwie koncepcje uczestnictwa obywatelskiego w życiu społeczno-politycznym, podkreślając różnice i uproszczenia występujące między poszczególnymi orientacjami zarówno w obrębie koncepcji republikańskich, jak i liberalnych. Interpretacji poddano główne idee, takie jak wolność, równość, wspólnota, dobro wspólne, solidarność.

Słowa kluczowe:

partycypacja obywatelska, wolność, równość, wspólnota, dobro wspólne, solidarność.